H3XAOperational intelligence
Live analytical pictureEvidence before assessment
TypeTechnique
External ID—
First seen2026-08-14
Last seen2026-08-14

Confidence

—

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes) Default accounts are not limited to client machines; rather, they also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications, whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen [Private Keys](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/004) or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021).(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module) Default accounts may be created on a system after initial setup by connecting or integrating it with another application. For example, when an ESXi server is connected to a vCenter server, a default privileged account called `vpxuser` is created on the ESXi server. If a threat actor is able to compromise this account’s credentials (for example, via [Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212) on the vCenter host), they will then have access to the ESXi server.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)(Citation: Pentera vCenter Information Disclosure)

11 recorded

Relationships

mitigatesMitigation
mitigatesMitigation
subtechnique-ofTechnique
usesGroup
uses
from FIN13
Group
usesCampaign
usesMalware
usesGroup
uses
from Stuxnet
Malware
uses
from UNC3886
Group
7 external

References

mitre-attack
T1078.001
open
Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/vmware-esxi-zero-day-bypass/
open
AWS Root User
https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_root-user.html
open
Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts
open
Metasploit SSH Module
https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh
open
Threat Matrix for Kubernetes
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/
open
Pentera vCenter Information Disclosure
https://pentera.io/blog/information-disclosure-in-vmware-vcenter/
open