H3XAOperational intelligence
Live analytical pictureEvidence before assessment
TypeTechnique
External ID—
First seen2026-08-14
Last seen2026-08-14

Confidence

—

Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) Shared memory directories on Linux systems (`/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock`) and volatile directories on Network Devices (`/tmp` and `/volatile`) may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk.(Citation: Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory)(Citation: Akami Frog4Shell 2024)(Citation: Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024)(Citation: Bitsight 7777 Botnet)(Citation: CISCO Nexus 900 Config). Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by antivirus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.(Citation: Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022) Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)

33 recorded

Relationships

mitigates
from Audit
Mitigation
subtechnique-ofTechnique
uses
from APT32
Group
uses
from Chaes
Malware
usesMalware
uses
from ComRAT
Malware
usesMalware
usesMalware
usesMalware
usesMalware
usesMalware
uses
from NETWIRE
Malware
usesCampaign
uses
from Pikabot
Malware
usesMalware
uses
from PipeMon
Malware
usesMalware
uses
from QakBot
Malware
usesCampaign
usesMalware
usesMalware
uses
from RegDuke
Malware
uses
from REvil
Malware
usesMalware
uses
from Sibot
Malware
usesMalware
usesMalware
usesMalware
uses
from Turla
Group
usesMalware
usesMalware
uses
from Valak
Malware
uses
from Volgmer
Malware
9 external

References

mitre-attack
T1027.011
open
Aquasec Muhstik Malware 2024
https://www.aquasec.com/blog/muhstik-malware-targets-message-queuing-services-applications/
open
Bitsight 7777 Botnet
https://www.bitsight.com/blog/7777-botnet-insights-multi-target-botnet
open
CISCO Nexus 900 Config
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/nexus9000/sw/7-x/fundamentals/configuration/guide/b_Cisco_Nexus_9000_Series_NX-OS_Fundamentals_Configuration_Guide_7x/b_Cisco_Nexus_9000_Series_NX-OS_Fundamentals_Configuration_Guide_7x_chapter_01000.html
open
Elastic Binary Executed from Shared Memory Directory
https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-3-binary-executed-from-shared-memory-directory.html
open
SecureList Fileless
https://securelist.com/a-new-secret-stash-for-fileless-malware/106393/
open
Microsoft Fileless
https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/fileless-threats
open
Sysdig Fileless Malware 23022
https://sysdig.com/blog/containers-read-only-fileless-malware/
open
Akami Frog4Shell 2024
https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/fritzfrog-botnet-new-capabilities-log4shell
open