Threat intelligence / Technique

Retrieval Content Crafting

Adversaries may write content designed to be retrieved by user queries and influence a user of the system in some way. This abuses the trust the user has in the system. The crafted content can be combined with a prompt injection. It can also stand alone in a separate document or email. The adversary must get the crafted content into the victim\u0027s database, such as a vector database used in a retrieval augmented generation (RAG) system. This may be accomplished via cyber access, or by abusing the ingestion mechanisms common in RAG systems (see [RAG Poisoning](/techniques/AML.T0070)). Large language models may be used as an assistant to aid an adversary in crafting content.

Technique

TypeTechnique

External ID—

First seen2026-08-14

Last seen2026-08-14

Confidence

—

Adversaries may write content designed to be retrieved by user queries and influence a user of the system in some way. This abuses the trust the user has in the system. The crafted content can be combined with a prompt injection. It can also stand alone in a separate document or email. The adversary must get the crafted content into the victim\u0027s database, such as a vector database used in a retrieval augmented generation (RAG) system. This may be accomplished via cyber access, or by abusing the ingestion mechanisms common in RAG systems (see [RAG Poisoning](/techniques/AML.T0070)). Large language models may be used as an assistant to aid an adversary in crafting content.

4 recorded

Relationships

mitigates

from Generative AI Guardrails

Mitigation

uses

from Data Exfiltration from Slack AI via Indirect Prompt Injection

Campaign

uses

from EchoLeak: Zero-Click Prompt Injection Targeting M365 Copilot for Data Exfiltration

Campaign

uses

from Financial Transaction Hijacking with M365 Copilot as an Insider

Campaign

1 external

References

mitre-atlas

AML.T0066